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1   Introduction  
Cereal production and marketing are the means of livelihood for millions of households in 
Ethiopia. It is the single largest sub-sector within Ethiopia’s agriculture, far exceeding all 
others in terms of its share in rural employment, agricultural land use, calorie intake, and 
contribution  to  national  income.  Therefore,  while  the  country  has  experimented  with 
almost  all  dominant  forms  of  political  and  economic  ideologies,
2  keeping  the  cereal 
subsector stable has influenced the agricultural policy thinking of all three political regimes 
over the past half century. The monarchic regime instituted grain market board; the central 
planning region (1974-91) renamed it  the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) and 
expanded its scope to practically take over the staple food markets; and while the current 
government implemented substantial reforms, it continues to maintain the necessary policy 
instruments to intervene in case of emergencies.     
There is a widespread recognition that parastatal-centric policies of cereal price stabilization 
proved expensive and led  to inequitable distribution of benefits. However, recent policy 
actions suggest that, like many other developing countries, Ethiopia is not yet ready to fully 
rely on markets.  This became particularly evident during the food price crisis when the 
government re-instituted urban food rationing programs, carried out open market sales, 
and suspended local procurement by  the World Food Programme ( WFP), country’s food 
logistic agency (Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise), and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). This perhaps reflects the fact that risks of price instability—in term of economic, 
human, and political costs—is still the predominant consideration in food policy making of 
the country.   
This paper discusses the sources of such concerns and how they are reflected in recent 
policy actions. It provides evidence of the subsector’s significance; characterizes the key 
cereal markets in terms of production, trade, and price patterns; and summarizes the policy 
actions following food price crisis. The evidence on the importance of selected cereals is 
presented in Section 2, which is followed by a discussion of production and trade of those 
cereals.  Section  4  analyzes  price  patterns,  focusing  on  seasonality  and  tradability.  A 
summary of public policy actions following the global food crisis is presented in Section 5; 
and the paper concludes with a summary and implications.  
2  Importance of staple foods 
2.1  Overall significance and policy emphasis    
Cereal  production  and  marketing  constitute  the  single  largest  sub-sector  in  Ethiopian 
economy.  It  accounts  for  roughly  60  percent  of  rural  employment,  80  percent  of  total 
cultivated land, more than 40 percent of a typical household’s food expenditure, and more 
than 60 percent of total caloric intake.
3 The contribution of cereals to national income is 
also large. According to available estimates, cereal production represents about 30 percent 
of gross domestic product (GDP). This calculation follows from the fact that agriculture is 48 
                                                      
2 Imports substitution and monarchic rules in late 1950 until the fall of the regime in 1974; central planning 
during 1974-1991; and gradual move towards a market economy since the mid-1990s.  
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percent  of  the  nation’s  GDP  (World  Bank,  2007),  and  that  cereals’  contribution  to 
agricultural GDP is 65 percent (Diao et al. 2007).
4   
Thus,  it  is  no  surprise  that  sub -sector  has  received  so  much  policy  attention.   The 
government places heavy emphasis on cereals in almost of all of its development strategy 
documents.  The  Agricultural  Development  Led  Industrialization  (ADLI),  the  Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP), the Sustainable Development to End 
Poverty (PASDEP)—all highlight the importance of cereals in overall economic development. 
The Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension Systems (PADETS), instituted in the 
mid-1990s, were especially designed to increase cereal production through demonstrations 
of seed-fertilizer technology. As part of these strategies, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) 
has  undertaken  substantial  market  reforms,  accelerated  investments  in  road  and 
communication  networks,  and  adopted  major  programs  to  increase  cereal  production 
through demonstrations of the benefits of modern seeds and greater fertilizer use. This 
policy emphases on cereals, both for economic growth and poverty reduction, has resulted 
in significant changes in the structure and performance of the cereal markets.
5   
2.2  Importance of cereal in household diets 
In term of caloric intake, cereals dominates the diets of Ethiopian households. The FAO 
estimates from 2003, presented in Table 1, suggest an average Ethiopian consumes 1858 
kilocalories. Of the total calorie consumption, four major cereals (maize, teff, wheat, and 
sorghum) account for more than 60 percent, with maize and wheat representing 20 percent 
each.  The  low  share  of  teff  in  calorie  consumption  often  come  as  surprise  to  urban 
Ethiopians,  as  teff  is  the  predominant  staple  in  the  of  the  middle-  and  high-  income 
households.       
 
Table 1.  Importance of staple foods in diet of Ethiopia (2003) 
Commodities 
  Daily caloric intake 
Percentage of daily caloric 
intake 
Maize  383  20.6 
Wheat  364  19.6 
Teff  254  13.7 
Sorghum  191  10.3 
Other  666  35.8 
Total  1,858  100.0 
Source: Teff numbers are from the CSA and others from FAOSTAT 
 
While Table 1 shows the importance of cereals only at the aggregate level, it conceals some 
important facts about the link between income and cereal consumption.  To illustrate that 
link,  disaggregated  estimates  from  the  Ethiopian  Household  Income,  Consumption,  and 
Expenditure survey is presented in Table 2.  A few important points can be made based on 
these numbers.  First, except for teff, caloric intake from cereals declines with the increase 
                                                      
4 Note that, although major cereals are teff, maize, wheat and sorghum; the calculation here includes other 
cereals (millets, rice, barley, etc) and pulses.  
5 Rashid and Negassa (2009) examines changes in the structure and performance Food prices in Ethiopia  Page 3 
 
in income—that is, moving from quintile 1 to 5. Second, rural households appear to derive 
more calories from cereals than urban households.  
 
 Table 2.  Calorie intake from cereals by income group and location (rural/urban) 
 







National   8.9  8.9  4.4  8.2  8.6  1.6  3.2  43.8 
Income groups 
     
 
       
     Quintile 1  8.9  9.6  6.9  9.5  10.5  1.5  1.4  48.3 
     Quintile 2  9.2  9.6  5.5  7.9  10  2  2.1  46.3 
     Quintile 3  8.3  8.9  5.3  7.9  10.2  1.9  2.4  44.9 
     Quintile 4  8.7  9.2  2.4  10  7.7  1.4  3.6  43.0 
     Quintile 5  9.4  7.5  3.1  6.1  5.9  1.4  5.5  38.9 
Urban / Rural 
     
 
       
     Urban  16.7  4.9  1.1  1.8  1.9  0.9  12.6  39.9 
     Rural  7.5  9.6  5  9.3  9.9  1.7  1.5  44.5 
Source: IFPRI calculations based Household Income, Consumption, and Expenditure Survey of CSA 
 
Finally, the contribution of processed cereals is still very low in Ethiopian diets, representing 
only  3.2  percent  at national  level, 12.6 percent  among urban households,  and  only  1.5 
percent among rural households. Across different income groups, the share of processed 
cereal ranges from 1.4 percent among the poor and 5.5 percent among the rich. This implies 
that processing is still at rudimentary level.  With current trends in income growth, there are 
likely to be changes in the consumption pattern and hence more demand for processed 
cereals.   
3  Production and trade of main staple foods 
3.1  Aggregate cereal production patterns 
It is clear from the previous section that cereal production in Ethiopia is fairly diversified. 
According to FAOSTAT data, maize has been the largest cereal crops since the 1990s: its 
production has increased from an average of 2.3 million tons in the 1990s to 3.2 million tons 
in  the  early  2000s.
6  Production  of  other  major  crops  has  increased  as  foll ows:  teff 
production from 1.6 million to 2.0 million tons; wheat production from about 1.0 million to 
1.9 million tons; and sorghum production  from 1.2 million to 1.8 million tons.  With an 
average production of 3.2 million tons in the 2000s, maize is the largest cereal crop in the 
country, followed by teff   (2.0  million tons), wheat  (1.9 million tons), and  sorghum  (1.8 
million tons) (Table 3). Note that production of all major cereals has increase over the past 
two decades in the country, which is perhaps a   reflection of heavy policy emphasis on 
cereals. Largest production growth is observed for wheat, which has almost doubled.  
   
                                                      
6 Note that FAO data series has not been updated since 2003.  Food prices in Ethiopia  Page 4 
 









Imports as %  
consumption 
Exports as % 
production 
2000's  Maize  3217  24  4  0.7  0.1 
 
Wheat  1922  877  0  31.3  0.0 
Teff  2002  0  0  0.0  0.0 
Sorghum  1809  9  3  0.5  0.2 
 
Total  10680  956  21  8.2  0.2 
1990's  Maize  2310  28  1  1.2  0.1 
 
Wheat  1047  417  0  28.5  0.0 
 
Teff  1588  0    0  0.0  0.0 
 
Sorghum  1248  55  0  4.2  0.0 
 
Total  7398  602  16  7.5  0.2 
Source: FAOSTAT except for teff, which compiled by the authors 
*Apparent consumption is production plus imports minus exports and non-food uses. 
  
3.2   Sources of cereal production growth 
Cereal  production  growth  comes  from  two  potential  sources:  area  expansion  and  yield 
improvement.  Ethiopia’s  cereal  production  increase  in  recent  years  appears  to  be  a 
combination of both. For the three major cereals (maize, wheat, and teff), both acreage and 
yield have increased significantly since 2004 (Table 4). Total production of these cereals has 
jumped from 5.7 million tons in 2004 to 9.3 million tons in 2007, representing an overall 
growth of 63.5 percent. Of the three cereals, wheat experienced the most growth (75%), 
followed by teff (61%) and maize (58%).   
 
Table 4.  Trends in land use and productivity of main cereals 
 





               Teff  
            Area ('000 hectares)   1,978  2,131  2,241  2,358  19.2  5.2 
Yield (tons/ha)   0.80  0.95  0.97  1.08  34.9  11.7 
Production ('000 tons)   1,588  2,022  2,172  2,553  60.8  17.5 
 Wheat  
            Area ('000 hectares)   1,091  1,375  1,446  1,529  40.1  5.70 
Yield (tons/ha)   1.45  1.56  1.53  1.81  24.6  18.6 
Production ('000 tons)   1,585  2,152  2,209  2,768  74.6  25.3 
               Maize  
            Area ('000 hectares)   1,415  1,356  1,483  1,743  23.2  17.5 
Yield (tons/ha)   1.77  1.74  2.21  2.27  28.3  2.9 
Production ('000 tons)   2,503  2,365  3,274  3,958  58.2  20.9 
 Total  
            Area ('000 hectares)   4,484  4,862  5,170  5,630  25.6  8.9 
Yield (tons/ha)   1.27  1.34  1.48  1.65  30.2  11.3 
Production ('000 tons)   5,675  6,538  7,655  9,279  63.5  21.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on various Central Statistical Agency (CSA) publications Food prices in Ethiopia  Page 5 
 
Besides these broad trends, Table 4 shows two other important changes in the Ethiopian 
cereal markets. First, the country experienced double-digit growth in the production of both 
teff (17.5%) and maize (25.3%), along with very impressive yield growths of 11.7 percent 
and 18.6 percent, respectively. A comparison of these numbers with those in Table-3 offer 
some interesting insights about changes in the cereal crop composition in the country. With 
an average production of 1.0 million tons, wheat ranked last among the four major crops in 
the 1990s. By 2007, wheat production had jumped to 2.77 million tons, making it the second 
largest cereal crops in the country.  
3.3  Cereal trade in Ethiopia 
Despite the increase in production, most cereal are internationally non-tradable. In other 
word, domestic prices fall between the import and export parity prices, and hence cereals 
are  neither  exportable  nor  importable.  However,  two  important  qualifications  need  to 
discussed to validate non-tradability of major cereals in the country. First, with an import of 
roughly  30  percent  of  consumption  (Table  3),  the  numbers  for  wheat  appear  to  tell  a 
different story. However, these numbers are deceiving, as cereal import data for Ethiopia 
include food aid, which averaged more than 700 thousand tons between mid-1990s and 
2004/05. Although it declined to about 225 thousand tons following the introduction of a 
cash-based social safety net program in 2005/06, food aid imports went up to roughly half a 
million tons in 2008.  Second, domestic prices of wheat and maize went above the import 
parity price in 2008 by as much as US$300 per ton (Figure 1). However, this resulted from a 
balance of payment crisis that led to foreign exchange rationing. Therefore, even though 
prices were way above import parity, there were no private sector imports of cereals to the 
country because private traders could not obtain the necessary foreign exchange.   
 
Figure 1.  Domestic (Addis Ababa) and Export-Import parity prices of wheat 
 
 
While  cereals  remain  largely  non-tradable  internationally,  domestic  trade  of  cereals  is 
critically important in the country. This is mainly due to the regional concentration of cereal 
production. Only two regions, Amhara and Oromia, account for 87 percent of teff and wheat Food prices in Ethiopia  Page 6 
 
production and about 82 percent of maize production of the country (Table 5). Therefore, 
given the size of the country, cereals need to be transported to deficit cities and rural towns 
some of which are hundreds of miles away from the surplus production zones. 
 
Table 5.  Regional patterns of cereal production, 2003-07 
Region 
Teff  Wheat  Maize 
2004/5  2005/6  2006/7  2004/5  2005/6  2006/7  2004/5  2005/6  2006/7 
Tigray  882  1,244  1,481  859  1,007  1,438  539  803  926 
Amhara  8,137  8,658  10,460  5,694  6,075  7,609  4,972  7,257  9,833 
Oromia  9,451  10,225  11,846  13,028  13,177  16,805  14,526  20,317  22,975 
Benishangul  117  134  129           -     29           -     500  627           667 
SNNPR  1,629  1,455  1,609  1,936  1,799  1,831  3,113  3,740  5,180 
Other regions  40  41  42  210  103  88  248  623  716 
Total  20,256  21,757  25,567  21,727  22,190  27,771  23,898  33,367  40,297 
% Share of Amhara & Oromia  
                 
87  87  87  86  87  88  82  83  81 
 
4  Staple food price patterns 
4.1    Real versus nominal prices of major cereals 
The nominal prices of teff and wheat rose gradually over the period 2005-2007 before more 
than doubling between mid-2007 and mid-2008. In contrast, maize prices were relatively 
stable over 2005-2007, but jumped about four-fold between mid-2007 and mid-2008.  Since 
mid-2008, maize prices have fallen by almost half and wheat prices by almost a quarter, but 
teff prices have hardly declined at all (see Figures 2-4).   
Real food prices (that is, after adjusting for inflation) increased as well, but later and less 
dramatically.  As shown in Figures 2-4, real staple food prices did not begin to rise above 
their historical range until March-April 2008.  Real maize prices rose about 80%, real teff 
prices about 40%, and real wheat prices less than 20%. The real prices of the three staple 
food crops have declined to varying degrees since then.  Compared to mid-2007, the real 
price of teff in mid-2009 was around 30% higher, while the corresponding increases from 
maize and wheat were 20% and 7%.  Thus, real staple food prices increased significantly in 
the 2007-2008 period; they have since declined, but have not returned to their 2007 levels.  
However, most of the nominal increases in staple food prices were the result of general 
inflation.    With  strict  monetary  policy  control  (such  as  a  significant  increase  in  reserve 
requirements for banks), the government has brought inflation under control.     
   Food prices in Ethiopia  Page 7 
 
Figure 2.   Nominal and real price of teff (2005-09) 
 
 
Figure 3.   Nominal and real price of maize (2005-09) 
    
 
Figure 4.   Nominal and real price of wheat (2005-09) 
 
4.2  Domestic versus world prices 
Domestic and world prices of wheat and maize (both in US$) are presented in Figure 3, 
which tells the same story as the other figures: while world prices exhibits a sharp descent, 
domestic  prices  have  not  followed  a  similar  decline.  Two  points  have  to  be  clarified in 
interpreting  this  figure.  Until  about  June  2009,  Ethiopian  currency  was  overvalued  by 
roughly  by  40 percent. During  July-August, the  government  devaluated  the  currency  by 
 
 Food prices in Ethiopia  Page 8 
 
about  25  percent.  Therefore,  until  the  summer  of  2008,  the  gap  between  world  and 
domestic  prices  was  artificially  high.   In other words,  if the  exchange rate  had  been  in 
equilibrium, the domestic price of maize and wheat would have been smaller. However, this 
does not mean that domestic prices would have come below import parity because the 
balance of payment crisis continues in the country and the private sector cannot obtain 
foreign exchange to import.     
 











Source: Authors’ calculation using EGTE data and & exchange rate from the NBE 
 
4.3  The facts behind the price puzzle  
There three key factors behind unusual food prices in Ethiopia. The first factor was that the 
growth in money supply far exceeded the overall economic growth in the country.  This 
clearly implies strong inflationary pressure. Indeed, a 2007 World Bank study argued that, 
during 2004-2006, money supply increased by 108 percent, and real GDP increased by 48 
percent. That is, growth of money supply was 40 percent faster than GDP growth. This helps 
explain the growth in nominal food prices over this period.  The real price of most cereals, 
except teff, actually declined during that time period (World Bank, 2007).  
The  second  most  important  factor  behind this puzzling  price  trend  appears to an over-
estimation of cereal production. The price trend in 2007-2008 was indeed puzzling because 
prices were going up despite reported growth of about 15 percent in cereal production. 
Compare this with 2002-03, when a reported bumper harvest of 9 million tons of grain 
resulted  in  market  collapse—so  much  so  that  some  farmers  did  not  find  it  worthwhile 
harvesting their maize crops.  The International Food Policy Research Institute and the Joint 
Research Centre of the European Union conducted a comprehensive study in order to better 
understand the this puzzling trends. The study involved a representative household survey, 
a market survey, a cross border trade survey, as well analyses of large amount of time series 
data. One of the key findings of the study was that production estimates of cereal from the 
IFPRI survey was roughly 30 percent lower than the official estimates (Minot, 2008).     
The final factor that caused domestic prices to rise  was the balance of payment crisis. 
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development. During the dramatic rise in oil prices in 2007-2008, Ethiopia did not adjust 
local prices until it was realized that the subsidy bill had ballooned to US$700 million, which 
knocked balance of payment totally out of equilibrium. The foreign currency reserve fell 
below the critical requirement of 12 weeks worth of imports.  In order to avoid currency 
depreciation, government instituted foreign exchange rationing. Around the same time the 
country was also  facing severe power shortages, which resulted in cutting down the hours 
of operations of many factories. This resulted reduced demand for factory raw materials 
and hence reduced demand for foreign exchange. However, it was not enough to  allow 
unrationed  access  to  foreign  currency  at  the  prevailing  exchange  rate.  This  problem 
continues.   
5  Food price policy 
Cereal market policies in Ethiopia have undergone dramatic changes over the past several 
decades. To a large extent, these changes mirror the underlying ideological positions of 
successive governments, from the feudalistic system during the 1950s and 1960s, to the 
pervasive  state  interventions  under  the  Derg  regime,  followed  by  considerable  market 
liberalization,  accompanied  by  an  extended  period  of  major  investments  in  road  and 
telecommunications infrastructure under the Meles government. The following is a brief 
summary of food policy under each political regime. 
5.1  The Imperial Regime (1960-74) 
Ethiopia’s  cereal  markets  under the  feudalistic regime  of  Emperor  Hailie  Selassie in the 
1960s were characterized by limited government intervention, a high volume of marketing 
relative to production, and very high transport costs due to limited infrastructure. During 
this period, agricultural land in the country was almost equally distributed among the state, 
church,  and  the  social  aristocrats.    Thus,  small  farmers  had  to  lease  lands  from  local 
landlords and political or religious authorities. Because rents to landlords and tributes to the 
state or church were paid in kind, marketed “surplus” of cereals is estimated to have been 
fairly high (25-30 percent of production), even though production of most farmers was near 
subsistence levels.
7 One key policy instrument that led to expanded intervention in cereal 
markets during the later years was the formation of the   Ethiopian Grain Board (EGB), 
established in 1952.  The mandate of the EGB included export licensing , quality control, 
overseeing marketing intelligence, and the regulation of domestic and export purchases and 
sales (Lirenso, 1987). 
5.2  State-Controlled Markets (1975-1990) 
Consistent with its ideology, the socialist government of Ethiopia instituted a wide range of 
controls  over  cereal production  and  marketing.  These  included  determination of annual 
quotas, restrictions on private grain trade and interregional grain movement, determination 
of  days  on  which  the  local  markets  had  to  be  held,  and  rationing  of  grain  to  urban 
consumers.
8  Wholesale prices of cereals were administratively set for many provincial 
markets and changed little between 1976 and the late 1980s (Webb and von Braun, 1994, p. 
48). 
                                                      
7 See Webb and von Braun (1994) and Ghose (1985) 
8  For details, see Franzel et al., 1989; Lirenso, 1994; and Lemma, 1996).  Food prices in Ethiopia  Page 10 
 
Land  reforms  under  the  Derg  regime  had  assigned  ownership  of  land  to  the  state,  but 
operational control to small holders, who were no longer obligated to pay large rents in 
kind.  When  this  system  failed  to  generate  sufficient  marketed  surplus  to  supply  urban 
consumption  needs,  in  1976  the  government  reorganized  the  EGB  as  the  Agricultural 
Marketing Corporation to procure grain for public distribution and price stabilization. The 
agency  was  made  responsible  for  handling  almost  all  aspects  of  agricultural  input  and 
output markets. It was involved in export and imports of agricultural products, buying and 
selling inputs, and processing and marketing of finished products. In addition, AMC was 
engaged in the construction of storage facilities, such as silos, and other structures and 
machinery. In short, the government and AMC took over the grain markets.  
5.3  Liberalization and Rapid Growth (1991-2009) 
Following  the  overthrow  of  the  Derg  regime  in  May  1991,  various  economic  reform 
programs  were  launched,  including  major  reforms  in  cereal  markets.  As  part  of  the 
reorganization  and  re-structuring  of  government  parastatals  that  began  in  1992,    the 
Agricultural  Marketing  Corporation  (AMC)  was  reorganized  as  a  public  enterprise  and 
allowed to operate in the open market in competition with the private sector.
9 The name of 
the agency was also changed to the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE) and  it was 
given  a  mandate to: (a) stabilize prices with an objective to encourage production and 
protect consumers from price shocks, (b) earn foreign exchange through exporting grains  to 
the world market, and (c) maintain a strategic food reserves for disaster response and 
emergency food security operations.    
However, the EGTE encountered at least three major problems in the subsequent years. 
First, there was a constant tension between fulfilling its mandate of price stabilization and 
that of competitiveness and profitability (Bekele, 2002). Second, EGTE was not effective in 
stabilizing grain prices due to its limited grain purchases and sales n etwork and shortage of 
working capital. The closure of branch offices and purchase and/or sales centers in regions 
with less potential for grain production, and in remote areas reduced procurement and led 
to under utilization of EGTE’s resources (Lirenso, 1994). Finally, the EGTE was often not able 
to  guarantee  purchases  at  pre-announced  prices  due  to  logistic  and  capital  constraints, 
which  had  led  to  shaken  farmers’  confidence  and  loss  of  policy  credibility  (Rashid  and 
Assefa, 2006).  
EGTE’s mandate was substantially revised through a series of proclamations and regulations 
during 1999-2000. These proclamations required EGTE to gradually move away from price 
stabilization  and  focus  on  export  promotion  and  facilitation  of  the  administration  of 
Strategic  Food  Security  Reserves  and  national  disaster  prevention  and  preparedness 
program.  The  EGTE  was  also  merged  with  the  Ethiopian  Oil  Seeds  and  Pulses  Export 
Corporation  (EOPEC)  in  1999  in  order  to  increase  its  logistic  ability.
10  But there were 
incidences of serious policy challenges after the 1999 and 2002 policy reforms. One such 
challenges is highlighted in the Box 1.  
The most recent and important attempt towards market development in Ethiopia has been 
the establishment of  the Ethiopian commodity exchange. While the original thrust of the 
exchange was on cereals, the exchange did not succeed in attracting large volume of grain. 
                                                      
9 Council of Ministers’ Regulation No. 104/1992  
10  Council of Ministers Regulations No. 58/1999. Food prices in Ethiopia  Page 11 
 
During its launching in February 2009, the exchanges traded only 200 tons. In November 
2008, the focus of the exchange shifted to coffee. The government issued a proclamation 
that dismanted the traditional coffee auction floor and required private wholesalers and 
exporters to sell only though the exchange. The government is again trying to increase trade 
of cereals through the exchange, but it is not yet clear what new instruments or incentive 
mechanisms will be used to make that possible. 
6  Responses to food crisis 
If price transmission requires actual commodity flows, there has not been any transmission 
of prices from global markets to Ethiopian markets.
11 Simply put, if price transmission had 
occurred in true sense, domestic prices would not have possibly stayed above import parity 
for such a long period of time. Thus, it should be pointed out that the policy responses in 
Ethiopia was more of an outcome  of  domestic  price rise than the global price rise .
12 
However, as earlier sections have demonstrated, the price increase in  Ethiopia was quite 
dramatic  and  continues  to  remain  a  serious policy  challenge.  There  were  four  direct 
responses to food price increase: (i) imposition of export ban, (ii)  re-introduction of urban 
food rationing, (iii) informal suspension of local procurement by WFP and others, and (i v) 
direct government imports for open market sales and price stabilization.  
The ban on cereal export was imposed in February 2008. This was based on the assumption 
that the production estimates were  correct  and  that  prices  had increased  because of 
exports. However data do not support this contention. The IFPRI -JRC study concluded that 
the cross border trade of cereal was  too small to influence the domestic market prices 
(Alemu, et al., 2009). The  rationing program however was large and has had  an impact in 
terms of reducing urban prices. The program was implemented by re-activating the kebele 
(local admin units) shop.    Under urban program, all  residents  in possession of kebel 
identification cards were eligible to collect a ration of 50 kg wheat (initially 25 kg) at ETB 1.8 
per kg. The market price at that  time was in the range of ETB 4 to 6 per kg. As a result, a 
parallel market evolved very quickly. Government also tried open market sales to traders at 
less than 50 percent of market prices but the program was abandoned quickly. The other 
channel of price stabilization was selling through flour millers at subsidized prices.  
The introduction of rationing and open market sales resulted in alarming decline in strategic 
food reserve of the country; it dropped from the target stock of 403 thousand tons to about 
17 thousand tons. At one point, the the country didn’t have enough food stock to carry out 
emergency  operations.  In  response,  the  government,  the  WFP,  and  NGOs  all  became 
engaged  in  importing  food.  According  to  available  data,  during  2008  EGTE  and  WFP 
imported 520 and 515 thousand tons of wheat and maize, respectively. While the WFP food 
import went to emergency operations and safety net program, the EGTE imports were used 
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Total Food Aid 
Deliveries (MT) 
 




(MT)  Maize  Wheat  Total 
2000  1,231,405  --  --  --  -- 
2001  980,434  15,030  20,324  35,354  65,904 
2002  265,903  10,000  53,337  63,337  72,116 
2003  1,886,829  22,025  11,729  33,754  76,565 
2004  731,562  71,008  28,809  99,817  117,240 
2005  1,003,938  55,652  31,527  87,179  149,192 
2006  551,757  146,475  4,804  151,279  154,661 
2007  284,513  56,168  --  56,168  31,299 
2008  626,092  29,339  --  29,339  40,852 
Mean  840,270  50,712  25,088  69,528  88,479 
SD  509,215  44,476  17,122  41,734  46,829 
CV  61  88  68  60  53 
 
Table 6 presents data on food aid inflow and local purchases by the WFP. Notice that food 
aid inflow declined to only 284 thousand tons in 2006, which is significantly lower than the 
average of 840 thousand tons since 2000. At this point, government’s policy focus was on 
reducing food aid dependence.  However, it proved very difficult when price stated rising 
sharply; so, the food aid is back to 6-8 hundred thousand tons again. Also, notice that WFP 
local procurement under LRP reach as high as 151 thousand tons of maize and wheat (more 
than quarter of a million tons if sorghum, beans, and pulses are added), but dropped to zero 
since 2007 in the case of wheat and small quantities in the case of maize.  
7  Summary and conclusions 
Cereals production and marketing are significant part of Ethiopian economy—in terms of 
rural livelihood, food and nutrition security, as well as national income. Therefore, policies 
under all political regimes that ruled Ethiopia over the past five decades have placed heavy 
emphasis  on  cereal  subsector.  This  paper  has  provided  evidence  on  the  importance  of 
cereals;  presented  a  overview  of  the  subsector  in  terms  of  production,  marketing,  and 
trade;  presented  synthesized  review  of  policy  changes  since  monarchic  regime;  and 
discussed the government’s policy actions following food price hikes during 2006-2008.  
The evidence on the significance of cereals in Ethiopian economy is overwhelming: cereals 
account for roughly 60 percent of rural employment, 80 percent of total cultivated land, 
more than 40 percent of a typical household’s food expenditure, and more than 60 percent 
of the calorie consumption. In terms of contribution to national income, our calculation 
suggest that cereal sub-sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of the national income. This 
explains why both economic growth and poverty alleviation strategies of the government 
have placed so much emphasis on cereals.  
Continued policy emphasis on cereal has brought about significant changes in the structure 
and performance of the subsector. Production of wheat and maize has grown significantly 
since  2000—so  much  so  that  crop  mix  in  the  country  has  changed.  With  an  annual 
production of about one million tons, wheat ranked last among the four major cereals in the 
1990s. In 2007, wheat production jumped to 2.7 million and its status elevated to second, 
exceeding both teff and sorghum. The production of other crops has increased significantly Food prices in Ethiopia  Page 13 
 
as well. Between 1990s and 2007, maize production has increased from 2.3 million tons to 
3.9 million tons, sorghum from 1.2 million tons to 1.8 tons, and teff from 1.6 million to 2.56 
million tons.   
Despite these impressive growth, all cereals except wheat (very occasionally) remain non-
tradable. That is, given the infrastructure and other market fundamentals, it is not profitable 
either to export or to import cereals in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, domestic marketing remain 
very important in the country due to concentration of production in two regions—Amhara 
and Oromia—which account for 87 percent of the nation’s teff and wheat production and 
82 percent of maize production. Therefore, inter-regional trade of cereal remain critically 
important, and public policies focusing on improving arbitrage efficiency can have a high pay 
off. 
Cereal markets in Ethiopia have gone through dramatic shifts over the past three decades, 
with each shift bringing about significant changes in agricultural price polices. The major 
thrust of the current government’s policy has been on (a) enhanced investments in market 
infrastructure, (b) gradual withdrawal of government controls, and (c) enhancing the scope 
and coverage of social safety net programs. This is line with government’s strategy to make 
transition from relief to development. The largest safety net program in Ethiopia is now 
conditional transfer programs, which not only feed the poor but also contribute towards 
growth through infrastructural and human capital development (nutrition supplement and 
school feeding).  
However, policy makers do not seem to be convinced that staple foods can yet be left to the 
market forces yet. The EGTE has continued ad hoc market interventions in recent years. The 
interventions, however, have been designed largely to address emergencies. For example, 
although  it  officially  withdrew  from  market,  government  instructed  EGET  to  make  local 
purchases in 2003 when maize prices collapsed. Similarly, in the wake of very high domestic 
prices,  EGTE  imported  more  than  half  a  million  tons  of  wheat  in  2008,  which  were 
distributed through the urban food rationing program, open market sales, and sales to flour 
mills. The objective was to stabilize prices.  
Food price increase in Ethiopia has been different from in many other developing countries. 
Unlike other countries, domestic price rise in Ethiopia was not related to world price rise. It 
began with rapid growth in the money supply relative to overall economic growth. This was 
later  aggravated  by  a  balance  of  payment  crisis  that  resulted  in  government  rationing 
offoreign exchange. Due to foreign exchange rationing, the private sector could not import 
to stabilize domestic prices. As a result, prices kept going up long after food  prices in the 
world market nosedived. Another important factor in domestic price rise appear to be over-
estimation of cereal production by the related agencies. According to an IFPRI-EDRI study 
official estimates of cereal production was around 30 percent higher.  
Taking all the factors together, it appears that that rising food prices in Ethiopia has been 
the outcome of monetary policy misalignment, the balance of payment problems resulting 
from sharp increases in fuel prices, as well as overestimated cereal production. However, 
although the sources of price rise have been different from the other countries, the policy 
reactions have been similar—increased intervention in cereal markets.  
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